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Guy Holburn is Professor of Business, Economics and Public Policy, and Suncor Chair in Energy Policy at the Ivey Business School. His areas of expertise are strategy, stakeholder management, corporate social responsibility, governance and regulation, with a focus on the energy and utilities sectors. He has published widely in top peer-reviewed academic journals, has authored numerous reports on provincial and federal energy policies, and is a regular contributor to local and national media.
Dr. Holburn is the founder and Director of the Ivey Energy Policy and Management Centre, Canada’s leading university-based centre for applied research on energy sector policy. He is also a board member of the Alliance for Research on Corporate Sustainability, a member of the Council for Clean and Reliable Energy, and a director of London Hydro, a Canadian utility.
Dr. Holburn has served as an expert consultant and advisor to corporations and governments in Canada and the U.S. He has provided advice on corporate governance, economic impact assessments, merger/acquisition strategy, electricity regulation, pipeline regulation, and regional economic development strategy. He testified as an expert witness on utility regulation and Crown corporation governance issues at the Muskrat Falls Inquiry in 2018 and 2019. He has also testified in court as an expert witness on business strategy issues in commercial litigation.
Holburn joined Ivey in 2001 and teaches both degree and executive development programs. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, and a B.A. Hons. (First Class) from Cambridge University. Previously Holburn worked for several years as a management consultant for Bain and Company in England and in South Africa, and for the California Public Utilities Commission.
Abstract: We contribute to research on governance of state-owned electric utilities by examining the implications of oversight by independent versus ‘political’ directors for corporate strategy. While policy think-tanks often recommend that governments appoint independent professional directors to boards of state-owned corporations, governments sometimes select politicians who bring a politically-oriented perspective to their oversight duties. To examine the potential strategic consequences, we draw on a novel survey of 384 directors of municipally-owned local electricity distribution companies in Canada, of which about a third were elected municipal councillors and the remaining were independent business professionals. The survey solicited individual director views about strategic priorities, including mergers and acquisitions, business diversification, and corporate financing options. Our statistical analysis of the survey response data finds that political directors, after controlling for prior executive experience and organizational context, were more risk-tolerant on average than independent directors, as evidenced by a greater willingness to diversify into unregulated business activities and to acquire equity stakes in other utilities; but at the same time, they prioritized enhanced dividend payments to the municipal government over re-investment in the corporation, a potential constraint on future business growth.
Abstract: Multinational firms often make multiple investments over time in a concentrated set of countries, accumulating superior knowledge and capabilities in these environments. Researchers have nonetheless uncovered factors that can lead firms to deviate from strategic trajectories defined by their prior investments. In a statistical analysis of country entry decisions by Japanese manufacturing firms over a 35-year period, we found that firms’ tendencies to re-invest in the same host countries were smaller for horizontal (i.e. market-seeking) investments but greater for vertical (i.e. efficiency-seeking) investments. We also found that organizational capabilities influence the geographic trajectory of international expansion: firms with stronger marketing and production capabilities were less likely to be influenced by the locations of prior entries and were more likely to invest in new countries.
Research summary: This study examines strategic and resource contingencies that shape MNEs’ country location choices. Our analysis of overseas production investments by Japanese firms (19712006) finds that differences in investment motives (i.e. horizontal and vertical investment) and corporate capabilities (i.e. marketing and production capabilities) moderate how prior entries into a host country affect subsequent entry decisions. In general, the positive impact of prior entries on investment in a country is weaker for horizontal investments and stronger for vertical investments. A more nuanced relationship emerges when entry decisions are analyzed in conjunction with heterogeneous corporate marketing and production capabilities. The study illustrates the novel insights to be gained from analyzing the joint impact of path dependence, managerial intentions, and corporate capabilities on country location decisions.
Abstract: This paper develops a new process for identifying the lowest cost package of energy efficiency measures (EEM) and hybrid energy system configuration for off-grid homes. Hybrid energy systems, which combine two or more types of energy technologies, often require significant capital expenditure, however, the cost can be reduced by applying EEM to the house to decrease energy demand. The method proposed here, termed Combined Optimization Process (COP), was tested on an off-grid hypothetical case and incorporates an iterative assessment of a building energy and efficiency optimization tool (BEopt) and a hybrid system optimization tool (HOMER). The COP results were compared with the base case where no efficiency measures were applied, and also with a standard process, which involved a selection of best-practice efficiency measures. The COP method yielded net present cost savings of 10% less than the base case, and 5% less than the standard process. The COP method developed in this paper is applicable for existing houses converting to off-grid status as well as for the design stage of off-grid houses.
Abstract: We examine how firms strategically manage opposition from organized stakeholders who participate in regulatory agency policy-making processes. As stakeholder opposition in regulatory agency hearings increases, we argue that firms invest more in developing counter-balancing support from elected politicians who oversee regulators, and more so when regulators are less experienced or are closer to re-appointment dates. We find robust statistical support for our predictions in a statistical analysis of financial campaign contributions to state politicians by firms in the U.S. electric utility industry during the period 1999 to 2010. Our findings contribute to nonmarket strategy research by providing evidence that firms respond to contested regulatory environments by cultivating support from elected political institutions, contingent on the degree of regulator sensitivity to political and stakeholder pressures.
Abstract: Drawing on internalization theory and economic geography research, we examine how the spatial structure of MNE subsidiaries in supranational regions affects subsidiary location choices. Our analysis of foreign production investments by Japanese manufacturing firms from 1971-2006 supports our theoretical predictions: firms were more likely to establish new production subsidiaries in countries geographically more proximate to existing production subsidiaries, but not to trading subsidiaries, in the same region. The proximity effect diminished for production subsidiaries engaged in accessing natural resources or R&D. Performance of production subsidiaries was also stronger for those closer to other production subsidiaries in the same region.
Abstract: We assess the utility of synthetic control, a recently developed empirical methodology, for applications in organizational research. Synthetic control acts as a bridge between qualitative and quantitative research methods by enabling researchers to estimate treatment effects in contexts with small samples or few occurrences of a phenomenon or treatment event. The method constructs a counterfactual of a focal firm, or other observational unit, based on an objectively-weighted combination of a small number of comparable but untreated firms. By comparing the firm’s actual performance to its counterfactual replica without treatment, synthetic control estimates, under certain assumptions, the magnitude and direction of treatment effects. We illustrate and critique the method in the context of the U.S. auto industry by estimating (a) the effect of government intervention in Chrysler’s management from 2009-2011 on its sales volumes, and (b) the impact of Toyota’s 2010 acceleration crisis’ on Camry sales.
Abstract: We examine the effect of consumer advocate participation in administrative procedures on regulatory policy. We use a unique panel database of rate reviews conducted for U.S. electric utilities from 1980 to 2007 to assess how state consumer advocates affect Public Utility Commission decisions on utilities’ allowed financial returns and rate structures. We find first that utilities experience fewer rate reviews in states with consumer advocates, consistent with utilities strategically postponing requests for rate increases. Second, after controlling for observed and unobserved state characteristics, we find that PUCs in states with consumer advocates permit a return on equity that is on average 0.45 percentage points lower than states without advocates equivalent to a 7.9 million (3.7%) reduction in average utility operating income, all else equal. Third, consumer advocates are associated with lower residential rates relative to other customer classes. Our findings provide statistical support for the thesis that institutionalizing interest group representation in administrative procedures is one way for legislatures indirectly to influence agency-determined policies.
Abstract: MNEs can learn from the foreign investment experiences of other firms when evaluating their own foreign entry strategies. We argue that other firms’ experiences reduce investment barriers arising from formal and informal institutional environments in host countries that are dissimilar from an MNE’s home country, thereby encouraging new entry. Our empirical analysis of foreign entries by Japanese public manufacturing firms over more than a thirty-year period indicates that the prior experiences of other firms in a host country mitigate the negative effect of formal and informal institutional distance on entry decisions: as other firms’ experiences in a host country increase, a firm is less deterred by greater institutional distance from entering the country. We also find that the distance-mitigating effect of other firms’ experiences in different industries is less significant when a larger body of same-industry firm experience exists in a country, implying a substitution effect between different types of vicarious experience.
Abstract: We examine how firms use political strategies to protect economic rents created by mergers and acquisitions against dissipation by regulators. In regulated industries, regulators can impose costly merger conditions, for instance consumer rate reductions in the utilities sector, thereby reducing shareholder gains. We investigate empirically whether and how firms use election campaign contributions to politicians as a method of influencing regulatory merger approvals. In a statistical analysis of campaign contributions by all electric utilities from 1998-2006, we find that utilities increased their contributions in the year before they announced a merger, and that merging utilities increased their contributions more in states with greater political party competition. Our findings contribute to political strategy research by providing novel evidence that firms integrate market and nonmarket strategies.
Abstract: A challenge for energy firms when considering new investments is to balance expected financial gains against potential risks. However, while investment opportunities in different jurisdictions are often straightforward to identify, the policy or regulatory risks for investors are more difficult to accurately ascertain. Here I provide a novel conceptual framework for how firms can assess regulatory risk that focuses on the institutional processes governing policy-making. Risks are lower - and policies will subsequently be more stable - in jurisdictions where regulatory agencies have greater autonomy from politicians and where policies are formulated through more rigid’ policy-making processes. The contrasting development patterns of renewable energy policies in Ontario and Texas offer support for the framework. I further develop strategies for how firms can successfully manage regulatory risks in different types of environment.
Abstract: We argue that information asymmetries between regulators and firms increase the administrative decision costs of initiating new policies due to the costs of satisfying evidentiary or 'burden of proof' requirements. We further contend that regulators with better information about regulated firms - i.e. with lower information asymmetries - have lower decision costs, thereby facilitating regulator policy-making. To empirically test our predictions, we examine the relationship between regulatory informational environments and changes to regulated rates for all investor-owned electric utilities from 1980 to 2000. We exploit several natural sources of variation in the informational environments of U.S. state utility regulators. These stem from the prior experiences and administrative resources of regulators observable policy decisions of other regulatory agencies for a given utility and differences in procedural regulations pertaining to rate increases and decreases. Our results suggest that as regulators acquire more information about utility operations, including from experience in office, they are more likely to enact rate decreases and less likely to implement rate increases.
Abstract: Even though governments may adopt favourable regulatory policies for renewable power generation, their ability to encourage private sector investment depends also on the presence of regulatory governance institutions that provide credible long-term commitments to potential investors. In the case of Ontario we contend that, despite large market potential and comparatively strong regulatory incentive policies, weak regulatory governance is one factor that has accounted for the challenges in attracting and implementing large scale private investment in power generation at a reasonable cost. We find empirical support for our arguments in a unique survey of 63 wind power firms that assessed private sector opinions about the investment environment for renewable energy in Ontario. Compared to a range of factors, firms rated the stability of regulatory policy among the weakest aspects of Ontario’s business environment. However, policy stability ranked among the most important factors in firms’ assessments of the attractiveness of alternative jurisdictions in their location decisions. Subsequent interviews revealed that firms have responded to this risk in Ontario by explicitly pricing it into wind project financial models implying higher wind power prices for ratepayers and by directing investment funds to other jurisdictions. We argue that policy stability in Ontario may be improved by devolving greater decision-making authority to regulatory agencies in the energy sector and by strengthening their institutional independence.
Abstract: Whereas conventional wisdom holds that multinational firms (MNEs) invest less in host countries that pose greater policy risk-the risk that a government will opportunistically alter policies to expropriate an investing firm's profits or assets-we argue that MNEs vary in their response to host-country policy risk as a result of differences in organizational capabilities for assessing such risk and managing the policymaking process. We hypothesize that firms from home countries characterized by weaker institutional constraints on policymakers or greater redistributive pressures associated with political rent-seeking will be less sensitive to host-country policy risk in their international expansion strategies. Moreover, firms from home countries characterized by sufficiently weak institutional constraints or sufficiently strong redistributive pressures will seek out riskier host countries for their international investments in order to leverage their political capabilities, which permit them both to attain and defend attractive positions or industry structures. We find support for our hypotheses in a statistical analysis of the FDI location choices of multinational firms in the electric power generation industry during the period 1990 - 1999, the industry's first decade of internationalization.
