

INVESTMENT ADEQUACY IN ONTARIO

How Market-Based Mechanisms Can Unlock Competition and Innovation

PRESENTED AT

Ivey Energy Policy and Management Centre
3rd Annual Workshop on the Economics of Electricity
Policy and Markets

PRESENTED BY

Kathleen Spees

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THE **Brattle** GROUP



Hypothesis


Market-Based Approaches Will Better Enable Ontario's Electricity Sector to Address Transformational Challenges:

**1: Getting COSTS
under Control**

**2: DECARBONISING
the Ontario
Economy**



**3: Unleashing the
Potential of NEW
TECHNOLOGIES**

Ontario Background: The Transition to Markets and Progress in the Market Renewal Program



Ontario Background: How the Energy Market “Bottomed Out” in the 90% Clean Energy Market

Effective energy price formation to signal shortage, surplus, and flexibility needs are more important than ever (including alignment with rates, contracts, and hydro taxes)




Sources: Hourly Ontario Energy Prices taken from [IESO Data Directory](#). Curtailments taken from IESO year-end data and OPG’s annual & financial reports. Water rental charge and property tax calculated from [Ontario Ministry of Finance](#), assuming \$43/MWh contract price and over 700 GWh/year generation.

Transformational Challenges

Challenge 1: Getting **COSTS** Under Control

Centralized planning and contracting combined with unforeseen/rapid changes to policy and fundamentals have driven cost escalation



Key Cost Drivers

- **Excess supply**, locked in for 30 years
- **Imbalanced mix** (excess baseload)
- **Limited competition** in procurements (lack of competition across techs, regions, term & vintage)
- **Dispatch inefficiencies** introduced by contract, market & other incentives


Challenge 1: Markets Drive Down **COSTS** by Harnessing Competition and Rewarding Innovation

Example: New Jersey competitive RFP for long-term contracts signed at prices 15-60% above competitive capacity auction prices

How Did the Market Drive Lower Costs?

- **More competition** across vintages, technologies, locations, and firms
- **Shorter 1-year term** offered (though private market enables financing via multi-year hedges)
- **Uniform price auction** incentivizes sellers to truthfully reveal minimum costs
- **Centralized auction** offers transparency, liquidity, and (some) regulatory stability
- **Uniform product** definition and qualification standards enable resource neutrality



New Jersey CC Contract Prices vs. PJM Market Prices



Sources: SNL Energy, PJM capacity auction parameters and results.
RTO = Regional Transmission Organization
PS-North is a sub-region of Public Service Enterprise Group transmission zone


Challenge 2: **DECARBONISING** the Ontario Economy

Electrifying the entire economy with (near) 100% clean power is currently the primary feasible path to 80% greenhouse gas reductions by 2050



Challenge 2: Markets Can Meet Policymakers' and Customers' **DECARBONISATION** Goals

Example: Forward Clean Energy Market (FCEM) is a design proposal to enable companies, cities & governments buy unbundled clean energy attributes. Designed to align with energy & capacity markets



Sources and Notes:

See the full design proposal in [How States, Cities, and Customers Can Harness Competitive Markets to Meet Ambitious Carbon Goals Through a Forward Market For Clean Energy Attributes](#) April 2019.

Challenge 3: Unleashing the Potential of **NEW TECHNOLOGIES**

Rapid cost reductions, technology advancements, and customer adoption rates amplify the need for a nimble marketplace that rewards innovators (and avoids locking in the costs of current technologies)



Challenge 3: Markets Can Reward **NEW TECHNOLOGIES** that Can Meet System Needs Faster, Better, or Cheaper

Compared to traditional planning and procurement, technology-neutral markets to serve well-defined system needs can better enable innovative solutions

System Needs	Technology Types												
	Coal	CC	CT	RoR		Hydro w/ Storage	Wind	Solar	Battery Storage	DR	EE	Imports	
				Nuclear	Hydro								
Day-Ahead Energy	✓	✓	○	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	○	○	○	✓	
Real-Time Energy (5 Min)	✓	✓	○	○	✓	✓	✓	✓	○	○	○	○	
Regulation	✓	✓	○	✗	✓	✓	○	○	✓	○	✗	○	
Spinning Reserves	✓	✓	✓	✗	○	✓	✗	✗	✓	○	✗	○	
Non-Spinning Reserves	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	○	✗	○	
Load following / Flexibility	○	✓	✓	○	○	✓	○	○	✓	○	✗	○	
Capacity	✓	✓	✓	✓	○	✓	○	○	○	✓	✓	✓	
Clean Attributes (RECs)	✗	○	○	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	○	○	✓	✓	
Reactive / Voltage Support	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	○	○	✓	✗	✗	○	
Black Start	○	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	○	✗	✗	○	

Technical Capability for Service


- ✓ Well Suited
- Somewhat Capable
- ✗ Not / Poorly Suited

Even non-traditional & carbon-free supply can provide essential grid services (if enabled to compete in a competitive marketplace)

A Market Vision for 2040?

Market Vision: Where Are the Markets Going?

Transitioning to markets would mean slowly replacing contracts with competitive markets, including for emerging system/customer needs



Takeaways for Investment Adequacy: Thoughts on the Ontario Capacity Auction & Potential “Supplementary Mechanisms”

- Capacity auction will begin delivering benefits on day one and grow over time as the quantity increases, product definition/design are refined & more resources are enabled over the coming years
- But capacity auction is just one component of the transition to a more dynamic, market-based sector
- Other reforms and new products may be needed to address all challenges including flexibility, clean energy, expressing customer preferences, and enabling the grid edge
- Recommend that the discussion around supplementary mechanisms maintain a focus on an overall trajectory to maximize the benefits of competition through resource-neutral approaches to serve well-defined, unbundled products

Presented By



Kathleen Spees
Principal
Washington, DC

+1.202.419.3390
Kathleen.Spees@brattle.com

Experience

Dr. Spees is an expert in wholesale electricity and environmental policy design and analysis. Her work for market operators, regulators, regulated utilities, and market participants focuses on:

- Energy, capacity, and ancillary service market design
- Carbon and environmental policy design
- Valuation of traditional and emerging technology assets
- Strategic planning in the face of industry disruption

In more than a dozen international jurisdictions, Dr. Spees's work has supported the design and enhancement of environmental policies and wholesale power markets in decarbonizing electricity systems.

Education

Ph.D., Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University

M.S., Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University

B.S., Physics and Mechanical Engineering, Iowa State University

Our Practices and Industries

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Distributed Energy
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Electricity Market Modeling
& Resource Planning
Electrification & Growth
Opportunities
Energy Litigation
Energy Storage
Environmental Policy, Planning
and Compliance
Finance and Ratemaking
Gas/Electric Coordination
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Environmental Litigation
& Regulation
Intellectual Property
International Arbitration
International Trade
Labor & Employment
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Litigation
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Valuation
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