Matching in Cooperative Education Programs: An Experimental Study
Many Canadian and American universities participate in cooperative education programs where students alternate between work and school terms. Many of these programs match students to jobs using a minimum sums algorithm (MS). In this first study of MS, we compare experimentally MS and improved variations of MS with the deferred acceptance algorithm (DA). While the improvements of MS sometimes increase truthful preference reporting and assignment stability, all perform worse than DA. Superior DA outcomes result from both the algorithm itself and the behavioural responses it elicits. Continued use of MS carries adverse consequences for human capital accumulation and lifetime earnings.
Bradley Ruffle
Bradley Ruffleis a behavioural and experimental economist at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. He is passionate about the design of controlled experiments, and his research explores an eclectic range of topics and research questions, including the determinants of insurance fraud; how rituals foster cooperation within groups; why in-kind gifts persist despite the efficiency of cash; industrial buyers’ ability to counteract monopoly power; whether more physically attractive job candidates are more likely to be hired; the relationship between tattoos and time preferences; and the labour-supply response to income and consumption taxes.