Research

Abstract: This paper explores the role of institutional objects in the constitution of institutional logics. Institutional objects depend for their objectivity on the goods produced through those objects, such as economic models, passports or sacred texts. We theorize institutional logics as grammars of valuation that institutionalize goods through institutional objects. We identify four value moments through which goods are objectified: institution, the instituting of a good, a belief and an imagination of its objective goodness; production, how the good is produced, what practices are productive of the good; evaluation, how good is the good, the practices and objects through which worth in terms of that good is determined, and territorialization, the domain of reference of the good, to what objects and practices a good can and does refer in its instantiations. We assess the adequacy of our model through an institutional object based on the good of “market value” - i.e. an options pricing model. We discuss the implications of these findings for institutional logical theory and the sociology of valuation.

Abstract: We examine how employees respond to bonuses and penalties using a proprietary data set from an electronic chip manufacturer in China. First, we examine the relative effects of bonuses and penalties and observe a stronger effect on subsequent effort and performance for penalties than for bonuses. Second, we find that the marginal sensitivity of penalties diminishes faster than that of bonuses, indicating that the marginal effect of a bonus may eventually exceed that of a penalty as their value increases. Third, we find an undesirable selection effect of penalties: penalties increase employee turnover especially for skillful and high-quality workers. These results may help inform our understanding of the observed limited use of penalties in practice due to their bounded effectiveness and possible unintended consequences.