Richard Ivey Building 3303
- Non-Market Strategy
- Corporate Political Strategy
- Lobbying Strategy
- Corporate Governance
- Political Economy
- Game Theory
- Economics of Strategy
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Davin Raiha joined the Business, Economics, and Public Policy group in July 2013, after completing his Ph.D at the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. A native of Canada, he also holds a B.Com from the University of Toronto.
Professor Raiha's research is concerned with the intersections of business strategy and public policy. His work examines the various methods and strategies that firms utilize to influence public decision-makers and the reasons for their use. This research on the political economy of strategy also shows how firms respond to - and shape - different policy environments and political institutions. He also has research interests in corporate governance, exploring what factors determine the governance structures that firms employ.
- Global Macroeconomics for Managers
- B.Com (University of Toronto)
- Ph.D (Stanford University)
Recent Refereed Articles
Holburn, GLF, Raiha, D,
2017, "Startups Are Turning Customers into Lobbyists", Harvard Business Review.
Callander, S, Raiha, D,
2017, "Durable Policy, Political Accountability, and Active Waste", Quarterly Journal of Political Science 12(1): 59 - 97.
Abstract: The policy choices of governments are frequently durable. From the building of bridges to the creation of social programs, investments in public infrastructure typically last well beyond a single electoral cycle. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of repeated elections in which policy choices are durable. The behavior that emerges in equilibrium reveals a novel mechanism through which durability interacts with the shorter electoral cycle and distorts the incentives of politicians. We find that a government that is electorally accountable nevertheless underinvests in policy, that it deliberately wastes investment on projects that are never implemented, and that the type of policy it implements is itself Pareto inefficient. The first two distortions match evidence from infrastructure policy in western democracies, and the third identifies a distortion that has heretofore not been explored empirically. Notably, these effects emerge solely due to the interaction of policy durability and political accountability, and not from corruption, poor decision making, or voter myopia.
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